Cary\u27s Government-Funded Municipal Elections: A Model for North Carolina by Palmieri, Daniel J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 80 | Number 5 Article 7
6-1-2002
Cary's Government-Funded Municipal Elections:
A Model for North Carolina
Daniel J. Palmieri
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Palmieri, Cary's Government-Funded Municipal Elections: A Model for North Carolina, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1845 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol80/iss5/7
Cary's Government-Funded Municipal Elections: A Model for
North Carolina?
Until 1999, no candidate for municipal office in Cary, North
Carolina had ever spent more than $10,000 for a campaign.' The 1999
election changed everything. Cary Mayor Glen Lang spent $37,000 to
defeat challenger Mary Kamm, who raised $147,000, largely with
donations from developers opposed to Lang's "slow-growth"
policies.2 In addition, an unsuccessful candidate for Cary Town
Council, Bob Hayworth, raised $47,000, with developers accounting
for more than ninety percent of his contributors. In response, Mayor
Lang and others on the Town Council vowed to "ensure that the
average citizen can be elected, and that various special interest groups
cannot buy elections."' 4 To realize this goal, Cary enacted a campaign
finance reform ordinance combining voluntary spending and
fundraising limits with partial government funding5 for some
municipal candidates 6-the first such program in North Carolina.7
1. Jay Price, Four Cary Candidates Accept First Money from Town's Coffers, NEws
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 16, 2001, at 3B [hereinafter Price, Four Cary
Candidates] (noting that such unprecedented spending was one of the primary reasons for
the proposal of government funding of elections in Cary).
2. Il. Lang and his supporters enacted slow-growth policies to maintain open space
by creating buffers around creeks, establishing a fund to preserve open space, encouraging
affordable housing, and charging higher use fees to commercial developers. See, e.g., Jay
Price, Council Seeks Diversity of Age, Wealth in Cary's Growth, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 24, 2001, at 1B (describing the impact of charging higher use fees in
Cary); Jay Price, Year-end Numbers Show Slow Growth Works, Cary Boasts, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 10, 2001, at 1B (detailing Cary's leaders' plans for future
growth in the town).
3. Price, Four Cary Candidates, supra note 1.
4. Jay Price, Campaign Finance Priority in Cary, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), July 15, 2000, at 3B [hereinafter Price, Campaign Finance Priority] (quoting Mayor
Lang).
5. Professor Bradley A. Smith asserts that systems commonly referred to as "public"
funding systems are misnamed. Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded
Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1999). "Campaigns are funded by the
public now-by hundreds of thousands, even millions of citizens who make voluntary
contributions to various candidates and organizations. What is euphemistically called
'public' funding actually means 'government' funded campaigns, or 'tax' funding of
campaigns." Id. Throughout this Recent Development, I will use the terminology
advocated by Professor Smith.
6. The ordinance reimburses the expenses of the top two finishers in a given race,
less the amount they raised, as long as their expenditures remain below an established
maximum. For example, a candidate for mayor can spend up to $25,000, and must raise at
least $5000 to qualify, so she can at most receive $20,000 in taxpayer funds. See CARY,
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This Recent Development considers the objectives and functioning of
Cary's system and its ineffectiveness in addressing the perceived ills
of a privately financed system. It concludes that this system is a poor
model for future governmental funding systems in North Carolina. 8
In enacting its taxpayer-funded campaign system, the Cary Town
Council identified several purposes commonly acknowledged as
foundations for any campaign finance reform initiative.9 Cary's
N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.8 (2001), at http://www.townofcary.org/depts/tcdept/
01013-1.htm (last visited Jan. 30,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
7. Jay Price, Cary Council Passes Campaign Finance Reform, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 15, 2000, at 1B [hereinafter Price, Cary Council Passes Campaign
Finance Reform]. In 1988, North Carolina enacted a campaign financing act to provide
government funding to candidates for Governor and the Council of State. See Act of July
7, 1988, ch. 1063, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 466, 466-71 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-
278.46 to -278.57 (1999)). The Act was later amended to allow government funding only
for gubernatorial candidates. See Act of June 25, 1991, ch. 397, sec. 1, 1991 N.C. Sess.
Laws 740, 740-41 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.46 to -278.57 (1999)). This
system establishes a fund for candidates from voluntary contributions of taxpayers due a
state income tax refund. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.46 (1999). Gubernatorial
candidates who choose to accept government funding must limit their expenditures to one
dollar multiplied by the number of votes in the most recent contested gubernatorial
election. Id. § 163-278.48. A candidate receiving government funds is entitled to dollar-
for-dollar matching for qualifying contributions from individuals or political action
committees. See id. § 163-278.50(b). No candidate may receive government funds in an
amount more than half of the expenditure limit in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.48. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.50(b) (1999).
The idea of governmental funding of political campaigns, especially for elected
judges, has been gaining increasing currency lately. The American Bar Association's
Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns recently published a draft report
recommending that all states with contested judicial elections create a system of
governmental funding as soon as possible. See ABA COMMISSION ON PUBLIC
FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, REPORT 31 (2001) [hereinafter ABA Report].
The North Carolina General Assembly considered several bills to provide for government
funding in appellate court elections in its 2001 session. See, e.g., H.R. 1171, 2001 Gen.
Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2001); S. 1054,2001 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2001).
8. For example, the North Carolina General Assembly considered a bill this past
session that would have provided a voluntary government funding scheme for appellate
court candidates. See S. 1054. The bill would provide $137,500 for candidates for the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, and $201,300 for candidates for the North Carolina
Supreme Court, provided they can verify their legitimacy by raising at least 250 donations
of no more than $500, getting 2,000 signatures on a petition, or by currently sitting on one
of the courts. See Rob Christensen, Senate Backs Funding for Judicial Races, NEWS &
OBSERVER, (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 20,2001, at 3A; see also S. 1054 § 163-278.64(b) (stating
qualifications required for government funding).
9. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 563, 563 (1999) (noting that two main problems of the present system are
inequality of voter influence and concerns about the system's integrity); Smith, supra note
5, at 591 (observing that the two principal arguments against private funding of campaigns
are the inequality of influence of some voters and the possibility of corruption by
politicians who may feel beholden to contributors); Christopher J. Ayers, Recent
Development, Perry v. Bartlett: A Preliminary Test for Campaign Finance Reform, 79
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ordinance first notes that high campaign costs often discourage
qualified citizens from running for office.1" This statement reflects a
desire for equality of participation-any person, regardless of wealth,
should be able to run for office." The second concern stimulating
Cary's ordinance is the appearance of impropriety in the democratic
process that may arise from large campaign contributions. A third
objective of Cary's system is to avoid the perception that an elected
official is beholden to contributors, or that those contributors will
have special influence on a politician's behavior. 3 The Cary Town
Council concluded that a system of voluntary spending limits and
government funding is a reasonable way to address these equality and
political access concerns.
1 4
N.C. L. REV. 1788, 1794-95, 1797-98 (2001) (stating that two compelling arguments for
campaign finance reform are reducing corruption and allowing equal political opportunity
by providing a level playing field for the electorate). The ABA Commission on Public
Financing of Judicial Campaigns has also found that qualified candidates may be
discouraged from running for judicial office if they lack access to large contributors and
that the public may be concerned that donors receive special treatment from judges they
supported. See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 20, 26; see also Briffault, supra, at 581-83
(noting the effects of large contributions on government and arguing that government
funding would cut the ties that bind politicians to large donors).
10. See CARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.1(a).
11. See id. (asserting that large sums of money should not be required to take part in
local elections). Cary Mayor Lang has argued that public funding "would ensure that the
average citizen can be elected." Price, Campaign Finance Priority, supra note 4 (quoting
Mayor Lang); see also Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth
Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273,276-77,297-98 (1993) (asserting that less wealthy
citizens are effectively priced out of political participation by the current fundraising
system and arguing that this "wealth primary" unconstitutionally blocks nonaffluent
citizens from political involvement and diminishes their influence in elections).
12. See § 2-55.1(b); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1976) (per curiam)
(concluding that Congress properly could limit individual political contributions to
diminish the appearance of corruption inherent in a wholly unregulated system).
13. Indeed, the ordinance states that no contributor should receive any special
political access (or even the appearance of such access) for his contributions. See § 2-
55.1(b). Mayor Lang affirmed this position, stating that government funding ensures "that
various special interest groups can't buy elections." Price, Campaign Finance Priority,
supra note 4; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (noting that the integrity of a democracy
is damaged if contributors are able to get a quid pro quo from politicians). But cf Smith,
supra note 5, at 609, 619-20 (arguing that the very point of political participation is to
influence political decision making, and that notwithstanding campaign contributions,
most politicians act based on their best judgment or their constituents' opinions).
14. See § 2-55.1(c); see also id. § 2-55.1(e) (concluding that the ordinance will assure
the public that qualified persons will not be discouraged from running for office and that
no persons will receive special influence because of political donations).
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Cary's approach has two main elements: a voluntary cap on
campaign expenditures 15 and a system of matching funds as an
incentive for those who accept such a cap.'6 To participate in the
Cary system, a candidate for municipal office must sign a campaign
contract within ten days of filing with the Board of Elections.17 This
contract mandates that a candidate will neither raise nor spend more
than $10,000 in the case of candidates for a town council district or
$25,000 in the case of candidates for at-large seats or mayor."
Importantly, however, "independent expenditures," expenditures in
support of a candidate which are made without consultation or
coordination by the candidate or her agents,19 do not count as
contributions or expenditures for the purposes of the Cary system.20
In some circumstances a candidate may escape from the
campaign contract after signing. A candidate may rescind his
campaign contract by written notice within fifteen days after the filing
period ends if no other candidate for the same office has entered into
a campaign contract.2 A candidate who does not rescind her contract
and participates in a race with at least three candidates, one of whom
has not signed such a contract, may elect to rescind her agreement if
she is a runoff candidate competing against the non-signing
candidate2 2 In this case, the candidate is no longer bound by
contribution or expenditure limits for the runoff period.'
Once a candidate has signed the campaign contract and filed the
state-required organizational report,2 4 he has met the initial eligibility
requirements for receiving government funding. Two obstacles
15. See id. § 2-55.6(a). In Buckley, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the
government could not impose a mandatory campaign expenditure cap consistent with the
First Amendment. 424 U.S. at 58.
16. See § 2-55.8.
17. Id. § 2-55.4(a).
18. Id § 2-55.6(a).
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(9a) (1999).
20. 'CARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.6(b).
21. Id. § 2-55.4(c).
22. Id. § 2-55.4(d).
23. Id. A candidate who makes this choice can still receive government funding for
expenditures for the election prior to his rescission, provided he has complied with all
requirements of the ordinance and files all reports required. See id.
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.40A (requiring filing of an organizational report
with the county board of elections showing all contributions and expenditures made on a
candidate's behalf). This report, showing a deposit of a qualifying amount of funding to
the candidate's campaign account, must be filed with the town administrator within ten
days of the close of the filing period. CARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.5. The
qualifying amount is $2000 for a candidate for a town council district, and $5000 for a
candidate for an at-large position, or mayor. Id. § 2-55.2.
[Vol. 801848
GOVERNMENT-FUNDED ELECTIONS
remain for receipt of such funds. First, in order to ensure that only
bona fide candidates receive taxpayer funds, only the top two
finishers in each race are eligible to receive funds?5 Second, to ensure
that candidates have complied with the ordinance, candidates must
file a final report with the Cary campaign finance administrator
showing all contributions and expenditures, and indicating how
taxpayer funds will be dispersed once received.26
Candidates who receive taxpayer funds are paid out of a special
account established with money from Cary's general fund.2 7 After the
election, candidates receive an amount equal to the difference
between their expenditures s and the contributions they have
received. 2 9 These government funds can only be used for a
candidate's "direct" expenses, and not for "indirect" expenses such as
the candidate's personal support or donation to another's campaign. 0
25. § 2-55.7(a)(1). Mayor Lang admitted that the top two candidate limit was
implemented in part because the town could not afford to subsidize all candidates for
office. See Cary Town Council, Minutes, Dec. 14, 2000 [hereinafter Dec. 14 Minutes]
(statement of Mayor Lang) at http://www.townofcary.orglagendalcouncilminO0/
cml21400el.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
26. § 2-55.7(a)(4).
27. 1L § 2-55.10.
28. Expenditures include any payment, purchase, distribution of funds, or contract to
do the same, made to support the election of a candidate. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
278.6(9) (1999). Candidates must calculate their own expenditures for their report to the
Cary campaign finance administrator, see GARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-
55.7(a)(4), as well as for reports to the County Board of Elections. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-278.40C (1999).
29. See CARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.8(a)(1). For example, a candidate
for mayor or an at-large seat can spend at most $25,000 under his campaign contract and
must raise at least $5,000 to qualify, so he can receive at most $20,000 if he is one of the
top two finishers in such races. For district candidates, $8,000 is available for the top two
finishers in each district ($10,000 spending cap less a $2,000 qualifying amount). A
candidate who spends less than the maximum or raised more than the minimum would
receive a smaller amount of taxpayer funds. A candidate who spends more than her limit
is in breach of her campaign contract and is not eligible to receive any taxpayer money.
See iL § 2-55.8(b). Campaign expenditures not more than ten percent greater than the
maximum, however, will not prevent a candidate from collecting government funds if the
expenditures are unintentional. See id A candidate who knowingly spends more than her
limit is also subject to a civil penalty of $500 or three times the amount exceeding the limit,
whichever is more. Id. § 2-55.13.
30. See id. § 2-55.11(a). Direct expenses include common campaign expenditures such
as printing campaign materials, buying media time, maintaining a campaign headquarters
and telephones, and direct mailings. I&. Although candidates only receive taxpayer funds
after the election, the prohibition on using the funds for indirect expenses is enforced
through the final report. This report must indicate how the taxpayer money will be spent,
and the campaign finance administrator will not disburse funds that will be spent in
violation of the ordinance. Id. § 2-55.7(a)(4).
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Cary's new system is problematic for several reasons, making it
an inadequate prototype for other governments. First, the amount
allocated for funding is probably too low to inspire additional
participation or to reduce corruption.31 Second, by setting the
maximum number of recipients at two per race, Cary's system may
discourage any additional entrants. 32 Further, because the outcome of
the election dictates who will receive the funds, candidates must
spend money with no guarantee of reimbursement.
With regard to the ordinance's first weakness, defining how
much funding is "too little" to meet a governmental funding system's
goals can be problematic. 3  As noted above, spending in the 1999
mayoral race far surpassed anything seen before in Cary.3
4
Notwithstanding these unprecedented expenditures, if the candidates
for mayor in 2003 choose to accept government funding, their
expenditures will be limited to $25,000.15 Mayor Lang supported the
Cary ordinance, so one can reasonably assume that he would accept
the government funding and spending cap if he ran for reelection in
2003.36 Given Mayor Lang's "slow growth" attitude,37 one can also
31. Several commentators have asserted that a system that set the amount of
government funding too low will rarely be used. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 587
(asserting that low limits "discourage participation, promote evasion, and increase the
burdens of enforcement"); John C. Nagle, Voluntary Campaign Finance Reform, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 1809, 1830 (2001) (arguing that the primary ways to inspire participation in a
government financing system are to increase funding or to reduce conditions on spending);
Smith, supra note 5, at 596 (noting that candidates will believe they can be more successful
running a campaign with private money when government-financed amounts are too low);
see also ABA Report, supra note 7, at 48 (stating that candidates will eschew private
money only if government funds are sufficient to allow them to communicate effectively
with the voters).
32. While it might be hard to quantify how many individuals actually chose not to
enter the race because of the top two candidate limit, at least one failed candidate
admitted he would not have spent as much of his own money had he known he would not
qualify for town funding. See Lorenzo Perez, Cary Gave Council Candidates $27,000 for
Campaigns, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 2002, at 1B (quoting Don
Hyatt).
33. Without mentioning a specific amount, Professor Briffault asserts that challengers
must be given a "critical mass of funds" to be successful. Briffault, supra note 9, at 569.
The ABA recommends "amounts sufficient to permit [candidates] to compete for judicial
office effectively." ABA Report, supra note 7, at 49.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
35. See § 2-55.6(a) (limiting mayoral candidates' spending to $25,000).
36. See Dec. 14 Minutes, supra note 25 (statement of Mayor Lang) (arguing that
candidates will feel pressure to participate in the program).
37. See Jay Price, Cary Council To Discuss Campaign Spending Limits, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 14, 2000, at 3B (noting that Mayor Lang and his allies
were outspent considerably by unsuccessful pro-development challengers); see also supra
note 2 (giving examples of Cary's slow growth policies).
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assume that, as in 1999, a well-funded candidate more supportive of
development will be a leading challenger.
38
Any challenger, pro-development or not, is unlikely to choose to
accept the $25,000 spending cap. 9 Mayor Lang will have significant
advantages because of his incumbency status, including better name
recognition, the opportunity to provide services to his constituents,
and more "free" campaign time through media coverage of his acts as
mayor.4" A challenger will most likely have to spend large amounts of
money just to achieve some level of name recognition, which is
essential to candidate viability.41 If both candidates are limited to
$25,000 and the challenger has to spend a greater portion of this
amount on name recognition, the mayor will have relatively more
money to spend on other forms of campaigning, such as public
meetings or get-out-the-vote efforts.42 The spending cap can thus
augment the inherent advantages of incumbency, severely limiting the
challenger's chances of victory.43 A serious challenger, or at least one
38. Slow growth council members, led by Mayor Lang, now dominate the town
council. See Jay Price, Cary Council Candidates May Play Musical Chairs, NEWs &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 21, 2001, at 3B (noting the dominance of Mayor Lang's
bloc). Although growth policies themselves were not a primary issue in the 2001 election,
several candidates complained about high development fees, and at least one candidate
noted that the tax burden could shift to homeowners if commercial growth was slowed too
much. See Jay Price, Cary Candidates Spar over Campaign Issues, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 7, 2001, at 3B [hereinafter Price, Cary Candidates Spar over
Campaign Issues]. If this slow growth domination of the council and increased tax burden
fully materializes, pro-development candidates may find more public support in the future.
39. See Nagle, supra note 31, at 1829-30 (arguing that challengers must be given
sufficient funds to compete with incumbents to overcome their general hesitancy to accept
a spending cap).
40. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 569 (noting these advantages and asserting that an
important goal of campaign financing should be providing challengers with sufficient funds
to challenge incumbents effectively).
41. See Smith, supra note 5, at 600 n.24.
42. Cf Editorial, A Cap in Cary, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 20, 2000,
at A28 (arguing that a spending cap coupled with government funding would level the
field for challengers, who must battle the incumbent's name recognition and fundraising
advantages). While Cary's system may equalize the fundraising difference for agreeable
candidates, the spending advantage would remain uneven. A challenger faces a serious
disadvantage if she can spend only as much as the well-known incumbent. See Smith,
supra note 5, at 605 (noting that challengers can compete on an equal basis with
incumbents only by being allowed to spend more).
43. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 569-70 (arguing that candidates cannot be successful
in government-funded campaigns unless they are given enough money to make them a
viable alternative to the incumbent). Mayor Lang and Council Member Jack Smith
contend that the measure is in fact anti-incumbent because incumbents usually have a
significant fundraising advantage over challengers. See Price, Cary Council Passes
Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 7. Their assertion, however, fails to address the
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with access to large-scale funding, would almost certainly eschew the
Cary system if she is to have any real chance for success.
44
One of Cary's goals in enacting the government funding system
was to increase the possibility of participation by its citizens-those
who are unable to raise significant amounts of contributions-in
municipal elections.4 With the spending limit set at $25,000 for
mayoral campaigns, increased participation seems unlikely.4 6  It
would be an almost impossible task for a political newcomer to defeat
an incumbent mayor with a $25,000 budget, even if the mayor
similarly has limited his own spending.47 The only viable challenger
will be one who is able to raise large amounts of donations. The same
holds true for open seats, when no candidate has the incumbency
advantage.' Once one or two candidates have broken away from the
group and have decided to raise and spend significantly more than
their opponents, the "citizen-candidate," who is unable to raise a
competitive amount of money, has little incentive to remain in the
race.49 With the spending cap for government funding set so low,
participation by those unable to raise significant donations will
spending problem for a challenger who is limited to spending the same amount as the
incumbent.
44. See Nagle, supra note 31, at 1829 (noting that challengers are hesitant to agree to
spending restrictions when their incumbent opponents already have the benefit of better
name recognition among the electorate).
45. Mayor Lang stated that without a source of money, a candidate cannot defeat one
funded by special interest groups, which results in a government that is not representative
of its community. See Cary Town Council, Minutes, Feb. 17, 2000 [hereinafter Feb. 17
Minutes] (statement of Mayor Lang), at http://www.townofcary.orglagenda/councilminO0
cm021700.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also CARY, N.C.,
ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.1(a) (2001) at http://www.townofcary.orgdeptsltcdept01013-
1.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting
that one of the purposes of the ordinance is to facilitate participation in elections by
qualified people who lack access to large sums of money).
46. As noted above, the incumbent has significant advantages over challengers,
including better name recognition and a better ability to raise money. See supra notes 40-
42 and accompanying text.
47. Council member Jess Ward apparently agreed, arguing that the system favored
incumbents because the equal amount of funding failed to address the incumbent's name
recognition advantage. See Dec. 14 Minutes, supra note 25. On the other hand, Council
member Jack Smith asserted that the equal funding level gives the challenger a fighting
chance by eliminating the incumbent's fundraising advantage. See id. Determining
whether Cary's system encourages new candidates is difficult because only one election
has been completed under the new scheme. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
48. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 11, at 289 & n.93 (noting that in elections for
open seats in the United States House of Representatives, the candidate that raised the
most money won seventy-one out of ninety-one races).
49. See Smith, supra note 5, at 605 (arguing that a candidate has little chance to win
unless he can spend enough to make his name and positions known to the public).
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remain small.50 For example, in Cary's fall 2001 election for Town
Council, only four out of the thirteen candidates opted to sign a
campaign contract and to accept government funding.51 Two of the
four were incumbents, 52 so at least for now, apparently, few additional
citizens are encouraged enough by Cary's system to enter municipal
elections. 3
Cary's second main objective in enacting the ordinance was to
reduce the appearance of corruption in elections 4 When faced with
a well-funded challenger who does not accept government funding, an
incumbent might continue to stand by a commitment to a $25,000 cap,
but this course is fraught with risk. At some point, a challenger can
spend enough to overcome the powers of the incumbency.5 On the
other hand, if the race is only between two candidates,56 the
incumbent can rescind the contract limiting his spending.57 This
response, however, also may present significant political risk for the
50. An amount that would be sufficient to encourage participation is difficult to
quantify. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 11, at 326 (arguing that the spending limits
struck down in Buckley (which would have been $152,000 in 1992), would not have been
sufficient that year, when the average cost of a U.S. House race was $543,000). The
amount could be more than a municipality dependent on property tax revenue is willing to
spend. Mayor Lang stated that the town "is not a source of unlimited funds" and that the
ordinance establishes the maximum the town is willing to spend. Dec. 14 Minutes, supra
note 25. Nevertheless, as this Recent Development explains, with Cary's funding limited
to the top two finishers in a given race, even a substantially greater amount of government
funding may not induce many more participants in future races. See infra notes 80-82 and
accompanying text.
51. Price, Four Cary Candidates, supra note 1.
52. Id.
53. In the last pre-funding race, there were fifteen total candidates: four for mayor,
two for an at-large seat, four for one district council race, and five for a second district
seat. See Wake County Board of Elections, November 2, 1999 Official Election Results, at
http://web.co.wake.nc.uslbordelecl99Novofficial.htm (on file the North Carolina Law
Review). Nevertheless, changes in the numbers of candidates in a race cannot be
attributed solely to changes in campaign finance systems. Incumbents may retire, choose
not to run for personal reasons, or choose to run for a different office.
54. Mayor Lang argued that large contributions by special interest groups raise the
possibility of corruption. See Feb. 17 Minutes, supra note 45; Price, Campaign Finance
Priority, supra note 4 (quoting Mayor Lang) (asserting that government funding will lead
to "clean government"); see also CARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.1(b) (2001) at
http:llwww.townofcary.orgldepts/tcdept/lOl3-1.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating that large contributions may create the
appearance of corruption).
55. See Smith, supra note 5, at 605 (arguing that challengers who can spend more than
incumbents can overcome the advantages of the incumbency and have a chance to win).
56. For problems associated with races involving more than two candidates, see infra
notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
57. See § 2-55.4(c).
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incumbent. s In addition, if the incumbent rescinds his campaign
contract, the election returns to the unregulated privately funded
system that Cary had attempted to escape.
A third option is available if the incumbent is not interested in
either facing a free-spending challenger or rescinding his campaign
contract. Cary's ordinance specifically provides that "independent
expenditures" are not counted as expenditures or contributions
toward a candidate's spending limit.59 Independent expenditures are
expenditures made in support of a candidate without consultation or
coordination by the candidate or her agents.6°  Hypothetically,
supporters of incumbents constrained by the spending cap might take
it upon themselves to purchase newspaper or television
advertisements concerning the incumbent's policies, but not his
candidacy.6' These advertisements may well have been designed and
aired by the incumbent's campaign but for the spending constraints.
Such advertisements are a form of "issue advocacy"'62 and are closely
related to "soft money. '63 Effectively, the incumbent's campaign is
able to exceed the spending cap with the help of other affies. 64
58. An opponent will likely attack the incumbent if he supported the taxpayer funding
system when proposed, but now shows an apparent lack of faith during an election. See
Price, Cary Candidates Spar over Campaign Issues, supra note 38 (noting that challengers
attacked incumbents for the increased spending that the Town Council had proposed). Of
course, the challenger may also face the political risk of being branded the "big spender"
who forced the incumbent to abandon his commitment to spending caps simply to defend
his seat. See Dec. 14 Minutes, supra note 25 (statement of Mayor Lang) (asserting that a
participating candidate can use negative advertising to attack an non-participating
candidate for attempting to "buy" the election).
59. § 2-55.6(b).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(9a) (1999); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 27
(1998) (noting that an independent expenditure is one made advocating the election or
defeat of a candidate without consultation with any candidate). The Supreme Court has
held that limits on independent expenditures are unconstitutional. See Colo. Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 618 (1995) (plurality opinion) (striking down
limits on independent expenditures by political parties); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45
(1976) (per curiam) (striking down independent expenditure limits for individuals).
61. If the advertisements are not coordinated with the candidate, they are
independent expenditures and are not included in calculating a candidate's expenditures
for purposes of the Cary ordinance. See CARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.6(b).
62. "Issue advocacy" includes advertisements paid for by parties or interest groups,
intended to influence voters by discussing candidates' views on issues, but which do not
expressly advocate voting for one candidate or another. See Smith, supra note 5, at 607
n.54.
63. "Soft money" is the term for the unregulated contributions made not to
candidates directly but to political parties, which often are used to fund issue advertising.
See id.
64. Soft money is considered such a problem on the national level that Congress
recently passed a bill that will, among other things, ban soft money donations to national
political parties and curb issue advertising. See David Rogers, Senate Approves Measure
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Both government funded campaign systems and the current
privately funded campaign system have drawn criticism for their
encouragement of soft money.65 Reformers have attacked soft
money, arguing it destroys the integrity of government by creating an
arena of influence for those wealthy enough to donate large amounts
of soft money.66 A system that gives influence to a limited number of
wealthy voters, or the appearance thereof, is exactly what Cary hoped
to avoid by enacting its government funding mechanism. 7 By setting
its spending cap and level of funding so low, Cary's system may
encourage a different kind of corruption in the form of increased use
of soft money and issue advocacy, replacing the corruption of direct
contributors with the corruption of indirect contributors.68
To Curb Big Donations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2002, at A4. President Bush signed the bill
into law on March 27,2002. Lawrence McQuillan & Jill Lawrence, Bush Signs Campaign-
Finance Bill, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2002, at A5, LEXIS, New Library, USA Today File.
Senator John McCain, the leading proponent of the bill, has argued that it will remove "at
least half a billion dollars out of political campaigns, and that's a good thing for the
political process." Jim Drinkard, Campaign Finance Bill Clears First Hurdle, USA
TODAY, Apr. 3,2001, at Al, LEXIS, News Library, USA Today File.
65. See Briffault, supra note 9, at 586 (noting that soft money "essentially nullifie[s]"
spending limits imposed in government funding systems); see also Stephen Ansolabehere
& James M. Snyder, Jr., Money and Institutional Power, 77 TEX. L. REXV. 1673, 1703 (1999)
(calling soft money "the bane of most reformers today"); Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money,
Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 179
(1998) (describing soft money and issue advocacy as the "villain du jour" for campaign
finance reformers).
66. See Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft
Money System, 24 J. LEGIS. 167, 177 (1998) (asserting that soft money corrupts because
large contributors expect a return on their investment).
67. Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1127, 1156 (1994)
(arguing that dependence on soft money has rendered politicians more responsive to
special interest groups than citizens and concluding that soft money should be banned to
alleviate this problem); see supra text accompanying notes 9-14; see also Stephen
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 598, 607-13 (2000) (arguing that, contrary to the assertions of soft money
supporters, soft money does not produce more competitive elections by helping
challengers overcome the spending gap relative to incumbents and that soft money does
not increase party loyalty in congressional voting).
68. Cary's leaders might consider imposing restrictions on the use of such funds, but
this approach would ultimately fail. Cary cannot make banning issue advertisements a
condition of the campaign contract because such advertisements are, by definition,
independent expenditures. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.6(9a) (1999) (defining
independent expenditure as one supporting or opposing a candidate, but not made in
consultation or coordination with the supported candidate or the opponent of the opposed
candidate). If the advertisements were made in consultation with the candidate, then they
are not independent expenditures and thus count against the candidate's spending limits.
See CARY, N.C., ORDINANcE 01-013.1 § 2-55.6 (2001) at http://www.townofcary.orgldepts/
tcdept/01013-1.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
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Another potential problem with Cary's system is that only the
top two finishers in any given race can receive taxpayer money.69 One
of the purposes of Cary's ordinance was to encourage qualified
individuals to participate in municipal elections.7" If, as previously
assumed, an incumbent candidate who supported Cary's system
would accept the funding, government funding would be available to,
at most, one more candidate. This assumes such a candidate can end
up higher in the polls than a well-funded challenger who will not
accept government money.
Having three or more candidates for a municipal office is not
necessarily unusual in Cary. For the 2001 election, eight candidates
ran for one at-large seat; three candidates contended for the District
A seat; and two competed for the District C seat.7' Only four of those
thirteen accepted Cary's offer of taxpayer money 2 Incumbent
council member Jack Smith took no risk in District C by accepting
taxpayer money, because he was guaranteed to finish in the top two.
73
Incumbent Jennifer Robinson of District A,74 on the other hand, took
a gamble by accepting money in a three-person race, although had
Review) (counting all expenditures and liabilities as within the campaign contract, except
for independent expenditures). If, on the other hand, the advertisements were truly
independent, they cannot be counted fairly against a candidate's limit if she had no part in
their planning. Cary might attempt instead to limit or ban soft money used for issue
advertisements. This is what is being attempted on the federal level with the McCain-
Feingold bill recently passed by Congress, but the constitutionality of such regulation is
questionable. See Smith, supra note 5, at 190-96 (arguing that limits such as those in the
McCain-Feingold bill are unconstitutional under a line of precedent beginning with
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); Ayers, supra note 9, at 1791-92 (arguing that the
proposed bill would likely fail constitutional scrutiny as long as courts continue to follow
Buckley jurisprudence); Drinkard, supra note 64, at Al (noting that the limits on issue
advertisements are considered to be the most vulnerable to constitutional attack). But see
Daniel M. Yarmish, Comment, The Constitutional Basis for a Ban on Soft Money, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 1257, 1277-79 (1998) (arguing that soft money expenditures can be
limited constitutionally when there is a danger of corruption) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at
262-65 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
69. See § 2-55.7(a)(1) (attempting to ensure that only bona fide candidates receive
taxpayer funds).
70. See id § 2-55.1(a).
71. Wake County Board of Elections, 2001 Candidates for Election, at
http://web.co.wake.nc.uslbordelec/2001Candidates.htm (last visited on Apr. 18, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
72. Price, Four Cary Candidates, supra note 1.
73. Smith won his race and received $6981.09 from the town. Perez, supra note 32.
74. Robinson was not technically an incumbent of District A. Prior to the 2001
election, she sat as an at-large member of the Town Council'but chose to challenge then-
sitting District A representative Jess Ward. Id. Nevertheless, Robinson properly is
described as an incumbent because she benefits from the superior name recognition of an
officeholder.
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she ended up in a runoff against either of her two opponents, she
would have been able to rescind her campaign contract.75 At-large
challengers Don Hyatt and Julie Robison, who also accepted the
government money, assumed the greatest risk because they had a
much higher chance of finishing outside the top two and thus
forfeiting any taxpayer reimbursement for expenses they would
incur.76
Jennifer Robinson, at least, recognized her risk and was prepared
to cover her own expenses.77 Her attitude reflects the problems
inherent in the "top two" arrangement. Being a person of wealth or
the recipient of large donations should not matter in a
governmentally funded election.78 Yet Robinson admits she might
have had to make up a funding difference if she had not finished in
the top tWo.
7 9
The fact that the recipients of the government money are not
identified until after the election provides an additional disincentive
to participation in Cary's funding system.8° Knowing that any
reimbursement from the Town will not come until after the election, a
candidate must have a source of money to spend during the
campaign, which discourages participation by those less wealthy
potential candidates.81 While Robinson may have been able to supply
the money for her campaign up front and bear the risk of not being
reimbursed, many people are not in that position. Cary's system may
75. See § 2-55A(d); see also supra text accompanying note 22 (describing conditions
for rescinding a campaign contract during a runoff).
76. Robison won the race in a runoff and received $16,910.40. Perez, supra note 32.
Hyatt, on the other hand, came in fifth and ended up spending $20,000 for which he was
not reimbursed. Id.
77. Price, Four Cary Candidates, supra note 1 (quoting Jennifer Robinson) ("Yes, it's
a bet, but I'm not too worried about that because... I feel like I can make up the loss
myself if I have to."). Fortunately for council member Robinson, she won her race and
received $3593.29 from the town. Perez, supra note 32.
78. Mayor Lang emphasized that one of the main goals of Cary's system was to allow
the average citizen to run for office. See Price, Campaign Finance Priority, supra note 4;
see also § 2-55.1(a) (stating that participation in municipal elections should not be
conditioned on large campaign contributions).
79. See Price, Four Cary Candidates, supra note 1 (quoting Jennifer Robinson).
80. Candidates are paid after certification by the campaign finance administrator and
the filing of their final report. See § 2-55.8(a).
81. Unsuccessful candidate Don Hyatt suggested that the post-election
reimbursement runs counter to the ideal of increasing participation by citizens of lesser
means, because they must borrow or raise money, or spend their own savings until after
the race ends. See Perez, supra note 32. Hyatt proposed that reimbursement (after
meeting prerequisites) on a "pay as you go" system would better address the needs of less
wealthy candidates. See id.
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cause some less wealthy citizens to avoid running for election because
of the gamble involved.'
Restricting taxpayer funds to bona fide candidates is an
understandable goal. 3 No government wants to make its funds so
easily available that people run for office just because the money is
offered. Nevertheless, the desire to limit the number of government
money recipients must be balanced against the goal of increased
participation.84 Cary's system already requires candidates to raise a
qualifying amount of funding,85 which itself helps ensure that a
candidate is legitimate by showing his support among the voters.86
Other ways to further verify a candidate's legitimacy would be to
increase the qualifying amount, to increase the number of
contributors required, or to mandate a number of signatures on a
petition.87 An outright limit on the number of recipients, however,
serves to discourage participation, or, at the least, fails to encourage
it.
82. For example, the political parties have found that many of their best potential
candidates have chosen not to run for Congress because they do not want to get involved
in the high stakes fundraising necessary to run a successful campaign. See Richard L.
Berke, Run for Congress? Parties Find Rising Stars Are Just Saying No, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1998, § 1, at 1. A post-election funding system like Cary's does not alleviate this fear
for a qualified person who lacks access to money to fund the campaign before the results
of the election are known.
83. See Smith, supra note 5, at 600 (arguing that funds should be available easily
enough to encourage candidates, but not so easily as to encourage frivolous campaigns);
ABA Report, supra note 7, at 51 (recommending that public funds be limited to "serious"
candidates).
84. See Nagle, supra note 31, at 1830 (explaining that in order to encourage
participation in a taxpayer-financed campaign program, governments must impose fewer
conditions or increase funding).
85. See GARY, N.C., ORDINANCE 01-013.1 § 2-55.5 (2001) at
http:l/www.townofcary.orgldepts/tcdeptlOl13-1.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
86. See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 52 (noting that a qualifying funding level shows
that candidates have made a "tangible display of support").
87. For example, Maine uses increasing levels of required contributions to ensure the
legitimacy of candidates for various offices. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1125(3)
(West 2001) (requiring at least 2500 five dollar contributions for gubernatorial candidates,
150 five dollar contributions for state senate candidates, and 50 five dollar contributions
for state house candidates); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.31(1), 11.50(2)(b)(5) (West
1996) (requiring donations of $53,910 for gubernatorial candidates, $3450 for state senate
candidates, and $1725 for state house candidates, all in $100 amounts). The ABA
Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns recommends requiring a
candidate to show a certain number of small contributions to prove her legitimacy as a
candidate, but acknowledges that a petition-based system, or one based on a party's
showing in the previous election could also work. See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 51-
52.
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Despite its weaknesses, Cary's system is the first of its kind for a
North Carolina municipality,88 and as such can be regarded as a small
step forward for advocates of government financing of elections. Still,
Cary's ordinance is not a model that other municipalities or states
should adopt, because it fails to accomplish its stated goals. With its
funding limits and spending caps set so low, Cary's system may be
unable to attract increased participation amongst those currently
unable to participate in privately funded elections. Moreover, with
funding available only to the top two finishers in a given race, persons
of lesser means may be unwilling to take the risk of entering the race.
Besides its failure to increase participation, Cary's system may
increase, rather than reduce, corruption. The low spending caps may
encourage some groups to turn to soft money or issue advertising to
support their candidate indirectly. If one views soft money as a form
of corruption, 9 Cary's attempt at reform might simply replace the
corruption of large direct contributors for the corruption of large
indirect, soft money, contributors. If a state or municipality is to
provide a viable system of government funding, it must address these
concerns.
DANIEL J. PALMIERI
88. See Price, Cary Council Passes Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 7.
89. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 66, at 177 (arguing that soft money undermines the
"core values" of democracy); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 67, at 1144 (asserting that
by circumventing contribution limits, soft money can nullify the advantages of a
government funded campaign system).
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